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Gifford: Juries: A New Weapon Against the Racially-Based Peremptory Challe

JURIES: A NEW WEAPON AGAINST THE
RACIALLY-BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984)*
The state charged appellant with second degree murder.' During jury selection, the defense objected to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges
to remove three black jurors. 2 The trial judge denied a defense motion to strike
the entire jury pool.3 Appellant was subsequently convicted. 4 The district court
affirmed the conviction and ruled that the denial of the defense motion was
not reversible error.5 On certification, the Florida Supreme Court reversed and
HELD, the Florida Constitution's guarantee of an impartial jury requires dismissal of an entire jury pool if a trial judge finds peremptory challenges have
6
been exercised solely on the basis of race.
7
The peremptory challenge dates to the inception of England's jury system.
In the United States, state8 and federal9 statutes retain the peremptory, extending the privilege to prosecution and defense alike.' 0 Traditionally, no ex.

The Supreme Court recently overturned Swain and erected in its place an objection

procedure substantially similar to the procedure adopted by the Neil court. The Supreme Court,

basing its decision on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, limited access to
the procedure to defendants in trials in which prosecutors have excluded jurors solely on the basis
of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 54 U.S.L.W. 4425 (Apr. 29, 1986).
1. 457 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1984). The defendant, a black, was charged with shooting a
black Haitian immigrant. Id.
2. Id. at 482-83. The jury pool consisted of thirty-one whites and four blacks. The remaining
unchallenged black served as an alternate juror. Id.
3. Id. at 482-83. The court heard argument on the defendant's claim that the state's challenges violated his federal constitutional right to an impartial jury. The court held that the prosecution did not have to explain its actions, but granted each side five additional peremptories. Id.
The State of Florida grants each side ten peremptories for cases involving offenses punishable by
death or life imprisonment, six for offenses punishable by imprisonment of a year or more, and
three for all other offenses. FLA. STAT. S 913.08 (1985). See also FLA. R. Gi0M. P. 3.350 (restating
the statutory provision).
4. 457 So. 2d at 483.
5. Id. The district court based its holding on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 457
So. 2d at 483.
6. 457 So. 2d at 487.
7. See L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINOS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 35 (1973) (postulating
that peremptory challenges were introduced into the English legal system shortly after the Norman
Conquest of 1066). Early American courts and legislatures accepted the peremptory challenge as
part of the English common law. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 148 (1977). In 1790 the peremptory challenge was codified
in a federal statute. Id. at 149. For an overview of the development of the peremptory challenge
in England and the United States, see generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 212-21 and J.
VAN DYKE at 147-51.
8. E.g., FLA. STAT. S 913.08 (1985). See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 281-84 (chart
showing state-by-state breakdown of peremptory challenges).
9. See FED. R. CiuM. P. 24(b) (prescribing the number of peremptory challenges allowed
for different levels of offenses).
10. The exercise of peremptories by criminal felony defendants has long been accepted. 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1803); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376
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planation was necessary for exercising the challenge.' The peremptory challenge,
in tandem with the challenge for cause,1 2 evolved as a device to dismiss jurors
who might have biases against either party." In practice, peremptory challenges
4
eliminate jurors when a party lacks sufficient grounds to challenge for cause.
In Swain v. Alabama,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors to dismiss jurors solely because
of race violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."' The
Court was unwilling, however, to fashion a broad remedy that would alter the
absolute character of the peremptory. 7 Under the resulting Swain standard, a
defendant objecting to peremptory challenges must prove the prosecutor repeatedly and systematically excluded jurors solely because of race."' Two decades
later, few if any defendants have met this standard of proof.' 9

(1892) (peremptory challenges termed "a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners,
for which our English laws are justly famous"). In the United States, the government's use of
challenges gradually gained acceptance in the last century, becoming firmly entrenched by the
beginning of the twentieth century. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 150. The Supreme Court accepted
the principle of the prosecutorial peremptory challenge in 1887, holding that the system should
guarantee "not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against
his prosecution." Hayes v. Missouri. 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
11.
See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
12. A challenge for cause is a device for excusing jurors "on a narrowly specified, probable
and legally cognizable basis of partiality." Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). Florida(
recognizes 12 grounds for challenges for cause. FLA. STAT. § 913.03 (1985).
13. The peremptory challenge promotes unbiased juries to the extent that it provides for the
dismissal of jurors whose biases may not be pronounced or apparent enough to satisfy the requirements for a challenge for cause. See Note, Limiting the Peremptoyy Challenge: Representation of Groups
on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1718 (1977). Historically, peremptory challenges may be based
upon "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare
looks and gestures of another," W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 353, or upon a juror's "habits
and associations," Hayes, 120 U.S. at 70.
14. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 146. Typically, state criminal juries are selected in
the following manner: Twelve jurors are called from the jury pool and questioned by both parties.
The prosecutor exercises as many challenges for cause as may be justified and then uses a number
of peremptories up to the statutory limit. Excused jurors are replaced by others from the jury pool.
The defendant then exercises challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. This process continues
until both sides are satisfied with the jury or until all challenges are exhausted. STANDARDS RELATING
TO TRIAL BY JURY

77 (Approved Draft 1968).

15. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
16. Id. at 224.
17. Id. at 221-22. "To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands
and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature
and operation of the challenge. The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory.
Id.
18. Id. at 227-28.
19. See, e.g., State v. Carthan, 377 So. 2d 308 (La. 1979) (defendant failed to prove systematic
exclusion of blacks from juries). But see State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) (defendant
established prima facie discrimination). The Supreme Court declined an opportunity to reconsider
Swain in McCray v. New York. See McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983) (denying certiorari).
Justice Stevens, in an opinion accompanying the denial of certiorari, expressed his desire that the
states continue to serve as laboratories for further study of the issue before the issue is undertaken
by the Supreme Court. Justice Marshall, in dissent, noted the harsh results of Swain's heavy burden
of proof and stated that he would invalidate Swain on sixth amendment impartial jury grounds.
A federal district court, subsequently accepting the defendant's habeas corpus petition, departed
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The California Supreme Court departed from Swain in People o. Wheeler.2'

The court considered Swain an inadequate safeguard of a defendant's right to
an impartial jury2' comprised of a representative cross-section of the community. 22 Accordingly, the court supplanted the Swain standard with its own procedure for determining, within the context of a single trial,23 whether group
25
bias24 motivated the exercise of peremptories. Under the Wheeler procedure,
either the prosecution or the defense may object to its adversary's use of peremptories and make a prima facie showing that jurors were dismissed solely
because they were members of a cognizable group. 26 Then the trial judge must

from Swain in ruling that the prosecution's use of peremptories had violated the defendant's sixth
and fourteenth amendment rights. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 750 F.2d 1113 (1984) (ordering a hearing to be conducted to consider states
rebuttal of prima facie showing of discrimination).
20. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). Defendants, both black, were
charged with murdering a white man. During jury selection, defense counsel noted that the prosecution had used peremptory challenges to dismiss seven blacks. The prosecutor twice refused the
judge's invitation to explain the reasoning behind the peremptories. An all-white jury subsequently
convicted both defendants. Id. at 263-65, 583 P.2d at 752-54, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893-95.
21. Id. at 285-86, 583 P. 2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909. The court found the right to
an impartial jury implicitly guaranteed by article I, section 16 of the California State Constitution.
Id. at 257, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910. "Trial by jury is an important right and
shall be secured to all. . ." CAL. CONsT. art. I, 5 16. The court asserted that Swain, because of
its systematic exclusion requirement, furnishes no protection to defendants who are victims of an
isolated instance of misuse of peremptory challenges, and it requires evidence that no defendant
can muster. 22 Cal. 3d at 285, 583 P. 2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909. See also McCray v. New
York, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 2441 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt that many jurisdictions
keep records of peremptory challenges or the race of those challenged).
22. 22 Cal. 3d at 285-86, 583 P. 2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909; see also Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (holding that the sixth amendment impartial jury guarantee
requires that juries in state criminal proceedings be selected from a representative cross-section of
the community). Although Taylor holds states to the representative cross-section rule only for venires
from which juries are chosen, the Wheeler court interpreted the rule as requiring "a petit jury that
is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random
draw permits." 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
23. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. "We must define a burden
of proof which a party may reasonably be expected to sustain in meritorious cases.
Id. at
278, 583 P.2d at 763, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
24. The court defined group bias as the presumption that certain jurors are biased "merely
because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic or
similar grounds ..
" Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. The court asserted
that the inclusion of group biases on juries fulfills the representative cross-section rule and achieves
an overall impartiality. Id. at 277, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03. See also Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) ("When any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature
and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.").
25. The procedure adopted by the court is derived from several sources. See, e.g., J. VAN
DyKt, supra note 7, at 166-69; Kuhn, Jwy Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235,
293-95 (1968); and Note, supra note 13, at 1738-41.
26. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. A "cognizable group" is
one that courts recognize for sixth amendment purposes. See Note, supra note 13, at 1735 (including
groups defined by race, sex, national origin, religion, age, economic status and occupation). Under
Wheeler, the objecting party "must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable
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determine whether a reasonable inference exists that jurors were excluded because of identification with a group.2 ' The judge may order an inquiry, compelling the challenging party to present evidence demonstrating that the
peremptory challenges in question were exercised properly.28 If the burden of
justification is not met, the judge should dismiss the jury pool and begin the
29
jury selection process anew.
Other states have followed California's lead in departing from strict adherence to Swain."' New York adopted a modified Wheeler procedure in People v.
Thompson.3" The Thompson court differed from Wheeler in holding that a court
may appropriately inquire into the use of peremptories only if the objecting
party establishes a substantial likelihood that challenges were exercised solely
on the basis of race.12 This test, stricter than the reasonable inference standard
of Wheeler, "": requires evidence beyond the mere exclusion of a number of black
jurors.'14 The court also granted broad discretionary power to trial judges in

group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule," and show a strong likelihood
that the persons were challenged solely because of their group association. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583
P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Suggested methods of proof include supplying evidence that
most or all the members of a group have been struck and that these persons share only the
characteristic of group membership, evidence of minimal questioning of the challenged persons at
voir dire, and evidence that the defendant is a member of the same group as the excluded jurors.
Id. at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
27. 22 Cal. 3d at 281, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
28. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The showing need not rise to
the level of a challenge for cause, but the party must "satisfy the court that he exercised such
peremptories on grounds that were reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial ..
"Id.
29. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The court recognized the difficulty
faced by trial judges in decisions on inquiry and evaluation, but expressed confidence in their skill,
familiarity with local conditions and experience in relying on the good judgment of the trial courts.
Id. at 281, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
30. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979) (not allowing
the peremptory challenge to be exercised with absolute and unbridled discretion); State v Crespin,
94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980) (adopting the Wheeler procedure). But seeMallot v.
State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980) (expressly rejecting Wheeler); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410,
591 P.2d 166 (1979) (rejecting Wheeler); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 438 A.2d 951
(1981)(rejecting Wheeler); State v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 286 N.W.2d 607 (1979) (rejecting Wheeler).
31. 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981). The defendant, a black, was charged with
grand larceny and possession of stolen automobiles. During jury selection, the prosecution used all
ten of its peremptory challenges against blacks. An all-white jury subsequently convicted the defendant of possession of stolen property. Id. at 88-90, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43. The Thompson court
based its holding on the impartial jury guarantee implied in article I, section 1 of the New York
Constitution through article II, section 12 of the state Civil Rights Law. Id. at 96 n. 13, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 746 n.13.
32. Id. at 108, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
33. The Wheeler court held that an objecting party must meet the burden of establishing a
"strong likelihood" that peremptory challenges were exercised solely on the basis of group association, but instructed trial judges to order an inquiry if "a reasonable inference" of group bias
arises. 583 P. 2d at 764. The Thompson court interpreted the Wheeler "reasonable inference" language
as suggesting that an inquiry is compelled merely because the prosecutor has used a number of
peremptories to exclude blacks. 79 A.D.2d at 110-11, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
34. 79 A.D.2d at 110-11, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
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applying the procedure.3 5 Only in exceptional circumstances will a judge's refusal
to order an inquiry into the peremptory challenges constitute reversible error
on appeal. 36 The court, in a further departure from Wheeler, discussed granting
the power to object to defendants only, 37 and limited objections to those chal3
lenges demonstrably based on race.
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court deemed Swain an impediment
to impartial juries as guaranteed by the state constitution.3 9 In its place the
court established a procedure containing elements of both Wheeler and Thompson.4 The instant court adopted the heavier burden of the Thompson "substantial
likelihood" test, 4 ' as well as that court's deferential treatment of the decisions
of trial judges. 42 The court also followed Thompson by restricting the grounds
for objection solely to racially motivated peremptories, but noted the procedure
might later be extended to cover other groups. 43 The instant court followed
Wheeler, however, in extending to both sides the power to object to the use of
peremptory challenges. 44 The court reasoned that both the prosecution and the
45
defense were entitled to impartial juries.
In dissent, Justice Alderman warned of the potential impact of the majority's
ruling. Alderman believed the impartial jury guarantee did not require departure
from Swain.46 He speculated that extending the objection process to prosecutors
may prevent black defendants from achieving their juror preferences in the same
47
manner it restricts prosecutors' actions.
By confining the burden of proof of discriminatory use of peremptories to
the context of a single trial, the procedure endorsed in Wheeler, Thompson and
the instant case furnisheg defendants substantial protection of their right to
representative panels. This right remained unprotected under Swain's require-

35. Id. ("[In] reviewing such determinations, even greater deference than usual must be paid
to the finder of fact.").
36. Id.
37. Id. at 108, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 753-54. At least one commentator favors restricting the power
to initiate the procedure to defendamts only. See J. VAN DvscE, supra note 7, at 166-67 (asserting
that courts should stop treating the prosecutorial use of peremptories as "a sacred right"). But see
note, supra note 13, at 1734 (proposing access to the objection procedure by both sides, in accordance
with the view that prosecution and defense are equally entitled to an unbiased jury).
38. 79 A.D.2d at 106, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
39. 457 So. 2d at 486. The pertinent portions of the constitutional provision read: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall... have the right... to have a speedy and public trial by
impartial jury ...... FLA. CoNsT. art. I, S 16.
40. 457 So. 2d at 486-87.
41. The court cited approvingly the "more even course" of the Thompson court in this respect.
Id. at 485. The exercise of peremptories carries a presumption of validity, rebutted only when the
objecting party meets its burden of proof. Id.
42. Id. at 487 n.10.
43. Id. at 487.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 488 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 489. Alderman read the majority rule as preventing a black defendant from peremptorily challenging whites for the sole purpose of increasing the number of blacks on the jury,
or from challenging whites on the basis of group prejudice against the defendant. Id.
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ment that defendants demonstrate systematic discrimination in the exercise of
peremptories.4 Defendants often lack the resources to demonstrate prior misuse.49 Moreover, evidence of past proper use of peremptory challenges does not
preclude present misuse. In restricting the scope of inquiry to the specific peremptories in question, the instant court has placed the defendant's burden within
reach. °" At the same time, the new procedure prevents a shift of focus away
from present prosecutorial behavior toward prior, less relevant conduct."
Any measure affecting the absolute nature of the peremptory challenge should
be narrowly tailored to leave intact its function of ensuring unbiased juries."
The instant court's adoption of the Thompson "substantial likelihood" burden
of proof attempts to prevent the improper use of peremptories through means
less intrusive than those employed in Wheeler.'"' This higher standard discourages
unsupportable objections and ensures that the procedure reaches the inquiry
stage only when defendants have thoroughly substantiated their claims.
In granting trial judges wide latitude in inquiry and evaluation, Thompson
and the instant court properly recognized that such judgments are best made
by those closest to the proceedings. "5 4 Trial judges observe attorneys questioning
prospective jurors and the conduct of both parties. The decisions required during
the objection process are thus based partly upon impressions that may not be
gleaned from the written record." Judges should not be constrained from considering these impressions.
The refusal of the courts in Thompson and the instant case to extend the
scope of the objection process beyond racially-motivated peremptories also is
laudable. While the instances of racially-based peremptory challenges are numerous,' evidence showing exclusion based upon membership in other groups
is less substantial. 7 The instant court exercised commendable restraint in lim-

48. See supra notes 19 & 21 and accompanying text.
49. See id. See also J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 166 (demonstration of prior misuse possible
only if defendant "has had an associate sitting in courtrooms throughout the area over a long
period of time, which is highly unlikely").
50. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
51. See Note, Systematic Exclusion of Cognizable Groups by Use of Peremptory Challenges, II FOROHAM
URB. L. J. 927, 947 (1983) (lack of prior history of systematic exclusion should not be a factor
in evaluating individual objections).
52. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
55. See Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 110-11, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, 755.
56. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 616 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. Ct. App., 1981) (peremptory challenges
removed 4 of 5 blacks from the jury panel, while the remaining black was dismissed for cause);
State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684, petition denied, appeal dismissed 290 S.E.2d
707 (1981) (prosecutor used 8 of his 11 preemptory challenges to eliminate blacks from the jury);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 371 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. Ct., 1977) (no violation of the accused's
constitutional rights even though 14 prospective black jurors were peremptorily challenged by the
prosecution).
57. But see People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (defendants
objected to use of peremptory challenges to excuse members of the Jewish faith): Patri v. Percy
430 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (petitioner claimed peremptories were used to prevent women
from serving on jury).
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iting the thrust of its holding to those groups that have demonstrated a need
for protection.
The instant court abandoned its restrained tone, however, by extending a
peremptory challenge objection to prosecutors. Unlike defendants, prosecutors
have little need for protection against their adversaries' misuse of peremptories.
Evidence of improper peremptory challenges by defense counsel is scarce." By
granting protection to prosecutors after denying it to non-racial groups, the
court failed to follow its own example of confining relief squarely to the problem
presented. The court could have maintained uniformity by withholding protection from prosecutors pending a demonstration of need. 9
The instant court's rationale for this inconsistent application of remedy distorts the principle on which the entire opinion rests. The Florida Constitution's
guarantee of an impartial jury is directed only toward persons accused of crimes.';"
The instant court's assertion that prosecutors may also avail themselves of the
protections afforded by this provision grants the state a right granted expressly
6
to individuals as a shield against abuse of state power. '
As suggested in Justice Alderman's dissent, defendants may pay dearly for
their victory. With the power to object in the prosecution's hands, defendants'
motives for challenging certain jurors, previously beyond question, suddenly
become suspect. 62 A chilling effect on the proper use of peremptory challenges
may result. 63 However, the gains in protection from prosecutorial abuse of the

peremptory under the majority's procedure make continued reliance on Swain,
as favored by Justice Alderman, an undesirable alternative.
Criminal defendants have long needed a shield against peremptory challenges
based solely on race. 64 The procedure adopted by the instant court is such a
shield, crafted carefully to protect defendants' right to impartial juries while
preserving the peremptory's attributes. The grant of access to this procedure
to prosecutors, however, is regrettable. Such access, for which a need has not

58. Such evidence that exists is purely anecdotal: The defense in the 1972 Harrisburg trial
used its 28 peremptory challenges to eliminate the most prosperous and "establishment" jurors;
the defense in the 1974 John Mitchell-Maurice Stans conspiracy trial used all 20 of its peremptories
to dismiss all jurors with a college education. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 7, at 155.
59. Prosecutors are more constrained than defendants in raising the issue of improper peremptory challenges on appeal. The fifth amendment right against double jeopardy prevents the
state from appealing acquittal by a jury chosen through the defendant's improper exercise of peremptories. However, prosecutors may raise the issue on a defendant's appeal of conviction. See
FLA. STAT. 9 924.07 (1985) (permitting the state to appeal rulings on questions of law when
defendants appeal their convictions). See also FLA. R. App. P. 9.140 (outlining appeals procedures
in criminal cases).
60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) ("a right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government").
62. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
63.

Cf. Note, supra note 13, at 1740 (noting the deterrent effect of threatened application of

a penalty).
64. The history of prosecutorial misuse of peremptories has moved one commentator to suggest
the outright elimination of the state's right to challenge jurors peremptorily. J. VAN DYKE, supra
note 7, at 167.
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been demonstrated, allows prosecutors to inhibit defendants' proper exercise of
the peremptory challenge. In an effort to safeguard defendants' fundamental
right to an impartial jury, the court has provided prosecutors a dangerous
remedy for an unsubstantiated wrong.
GLEN GIFFORD
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